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NOTES
THE THIRD PARTY'S, RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION
FROM AN EMPLOYER COVERED BY WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Arthur Larson, a leading commentator in the area of work-
men's compensation law, has said, "Perhaps the most evenly
balanced controversy in all of compensation law is the question
whether a third party in an action by the employee can get con-
tribution or indemnity from the employer, when the employer's
negligence has caused or contributed to the injury."' The debate
finds its roots in the rapid acceptance of the comparative negligence
theory of fault recovery 2 and the resulting conflict with the no-fault
recovery theory adopted by workmen's compensation acts.3 The
substanceof the controversy is two-fold: (1) should a third party be
allowed to seek contribution from a negligent employer, and (2) in
the event that employer contribution is allowed, should the em-
1. 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 5 76.10, at 14-287 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as LARSONI. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota has recently held that
a third party is not entitled to contribution from the employer. Paur v. Crookston Marine, Inc., 83
F.R.D. 466, 473 (D.N.D. 1979). In Paur, an action for contribution against an employer covered by
the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act was denied to the manufacturer of a boat motor
and the retail seller of the boat from which plaintiff's decedent was thrown and killed. Id. The court,
relying upon White v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., Inc., 225 F. Supp. 940 (D.N.D. 1964), held that an
employer who complies with section 65-01-08 of the North Dakota Century Code has no further
liability to the injured employee, and therefore a third-party joint tortfeasor could not base an action
for contribution on "common liability." 83 F.R.D. at 473. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 65-01-08 (1960).
2. See C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §5 3.70-.580 (1978 & Supp.
1980). Currently thirty-eight states, including North Dakota, have adopted various types of
comparative negligence statutes. A pure comparative negligence approach, in which the injured
party can recover even if his negligence is greater than the negligence of the adverse tortfeasor, has
been adopted in Minnesota. North Dakota has adopted a modified comparative negligence
approach, allowing the injured party to recover if his negligence was less than one half of the total
(the 49% rule). A similar approach allows recovery by the injured party if his negligence was no
greater than the causal negligence of the defendant (the 50% rule). A slight/gross approach, in which
the jury decides whether the plaintiffs negligence was "slight" in comparison with defendant's
negligence, has been adopted statutorily in Nebraska and South Dakota.
For further discussion of comparative negligence theories, see id. at § 1.20-.60.
3. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.20, at 14-295. The vast majority ofjurisdictions have held that
a contributorily negligent employer who is in compliance with the state's workmen's compensation
law cannot be sued orjoined by the third party as ajoint tortfeasor. Id.
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ployer ever be required to pay the injured employee an amount
greater than the statutory workmen's compensation liability.
4
When third-party contribution from the negligent employer is
barred, as under the majority view, 5 the third-party tortfeasor - a
stranger to the workmen's compensation system - is made to bear
the full burden of a common-law judgment, despite the possibility
that greater fault exists on the part of the employer. 6 The
prohibition against third-party contribution acts to effectively
thwart the underlying function of comparative negligence schemes,
i.e., the equitable placement of the burden of loss for which two or
more parties are responsible. 7
This seemingly inequitable treatment of the third party is fur-
ther underscored by the employer's right to recover directly or in-
directly from the third-party tortfeasor the amount he has paid in
workmen's compensation benefits. 8 The employer's right to share
in the recovery against the third-party tortfeasor, however, never
exceeds reimbursement for the amount paid to the injured em-
ployee under the compensation statute. 9 The employer's relative
degree of fault generally does not limit his recovery from the third
party.' 0 Thus, the remedy of contribution has become a one-way
street, and the third-party tortfeasor is statutorily compelled to un-
derwrite the workmen's compensation system without regard to his
relative degree of fault.
Pure contribution has the effect of undercutting the central
concept behind workmen's compensation, that the employer and
employee receive the benefits of a guaranteed, fixed-schedule, no-
fault system. That schedule was intended to constitute the
4. See, e.g., Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 120, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684(1977).
5. See supra notes 1 and 3.
6. 312 Minn. at 126, 257 N.W.2d at 689.
7. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 5 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971).
8. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 71.00, at 14-1. "To avoid a double recovery by the employee the
statutes provide varying systems with the general effect of reimbursing the employer for his
compensation outlay and giving the employee the excess of the damage recovery over the amount of
compensation." Id.
The employer's right of recovery is provided by various methods. 2A LARSON, supra note 1,
71.30, at 14-25 & 14-26 n.l; see, e.g., Breitwieser v. State, 62 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1954)
(subrogation); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, S 138.5 (1975) (employer lien on employee's recovery); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.061 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979) (subrogation); N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-01-09 (Supp.
1979) (subrogation). In two states without statutory provisions, Ohio and West Virginia, courts have
usually denied an employer the right to recover compensation payment from a negligent third party,
on the theory that the right to subrogation is purely statutory, and on a finding that the doctrine of
equitable subrogation does not apply. See 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 71.30, at 14-25 to -28.
9. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 71.20, at 14-2 to -4. There are a limited number of narrow
exceptions. Id. at 14-5 to -7. See also Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Worker's
Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035, Appendix A.
10. See, e.g., Randall v. United States, 282 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Froysland v. Leef Bros.
Inc., 293 Minn. 201, 197 N.W.2d 656 (1972).
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maximum liability of the employer to his employee. ",
The purpose of this Note is to trace the development of this
controversy. The interests of the parties involved will be identified,
and proposed solutions to the problem will be examined. Finally, a
short-term remedy will be proposed and evaluated.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS
At common law, an employee injured .in the course of his em-
ployment was allowed to maintain an action against the party
responsible for the injury. Although the injured employee had a
cause of action against his employer in such a case, the employer
had the benefit of three onerous defenses. 12 The assumption of risk
doctrine was applied to bar recovery against the employer when it
could be shown that the employee had notice of the hazards existing
in the work place and voluntarily subjected himself to the danger
posed by those hazards. 13 An employer was also protected by the
fellow-servant rule, which generally prevented recovery against the
employer when one of his employees negligently injured another'
employee. 14 Finally, recovery could be barred by a showing of con-
tributory negligence by the injured employee, even when lesser in
degree than that of the employer. 15 Even in situations in which
these defenses would not apply, the injured worker was plagued by
the cost, delay, and uncertainty of litigation.
In response to the plight of the growing number of victims of
industrial workplace accidents, 16 state legislatures in the early part
of this century enacted workmen's compensation statutes.17 These
statutes have significantly altered the respective rights of both the
employer and the employee. Under workmen's compensation acts,
the employer is held responsible for all injuries to the employee that
occur in the course of his employment, regardless of fault. 8 The
employer is not allowed to raise the defenses of assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, or the fellow-servant rule. 19 The benefit to
11. N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-01-08 (1960). See Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d
466 (N.D. 1978).
12. See generally 56 CJ.S. Master and Servant 5 321 (1955); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 80, at
526-30 (4th ed. 1971).
13. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, S 4.30, at 26-27.
14. Id. at 25-26.
15. Id. at 27-28.
16. Id., S 4.50, at 32.
17. Id., S§ 5.20-.33, at 37-40.
18. Id., 5 1.10, at 1-2; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 176.021 (1) (West 1966); N.D. CENT CODE
S 65-01-01 (1960).
19. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.10, at 1-2; seealso McGough v. McCarthy Imp. Co., 206 Minn.
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the employer under such acts is relief from personal injury liability
and the concomitant likelihood of a large jury award. The injured
worker, on the other hand, is granted a guaranteed recovery for his
iniury without the expense, uncertainty, or delay of a personal in-
jury lawsuit.
20
The dilemma addressed in this discussion arose with the adop-
tion of comparative negligence, which, in contrast to the no-fault
basis of worker's compensation acts, predicates liability on the
relative degree of fault of each party.
III. THIRD PARTIES
Prior to discussing the problems and solutions of employer and
third-party liability, it is necessary to first define who qualifies as a
third party. While some third parties are total strangers to the em-
ployment situation, others have some direct relation to the em-
ployer, the employment situation, or the employee. The question
of whether a party is sub ject to suit as a "third party" or is immune
from suit is controlled by state statutes. Some states regard anyone
other than the employer as a third party, and thus subject to suit.
2 '
Other states, including North Dakota,2 2 grant immunity to the em-
ployer and co-employees in the same employment.2 3 At least two
jurisdictions have attempted to extend immunity to all contractors
and employees engaged in a common employment.
2 4
States granting immunity to co-employees allow the immunity
to attach only when the employee is acting "in the course of his em-
ployment. "25 States differ, however, as to which test of "course of
employment" is to be applied. In North Dakota, for example, the
workmen's compensation standard is applied. 26 California, on the
1, 5, 287 N.W. 857, 863 (1939); Pace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 51 N.D.
815, 822, 201 N.W. 348, 350 (1924).
20. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.10, at 1-2.
21. States which allow suit by an injured employee against a co-employee include Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana (for intentional acts), Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, S 72.10, at 82 n. 14 (Supp. 1980).
22. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-01-08 (1960).
23. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 72.20, at 90 n.23 (Supp. 1980).
24. In addition to Massachusetts, Florida moved in this direction for awhile. See 2A LARSON,
supra note 1, §§ 72.32-.33, at 14-66 to -82.
25. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, 5 72.20, at 14-39; see also N.D. CENT. CooE § 65-01-08 (1960)
("The employee shall have no right of action against such . . . other employee of such employer...
but shall look solely to the fund for compensation. ").
26. North Dakota's standard for determining whether an injury occurred "in the course of
employment" is as follows: "Does the injury occur within the period of employment? Does it occur
in a place where the employee may reasonably be? Does it occur while he is reasonably fulfilling the
duties of his employment? All these must concur under the circumstances." Bjerke v. Heartso, 183
N.W.2d 496, 500 (N.D. 1971) (citing Kary v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 67
N.D. 334, 339,272 N.W. 340,342 (1937)).
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other hand, bars the suit against the co-employee only if the co-
employee is actively engaged in some service for the employer at
the time of the injury. 2I Thus, when a question arises whether the
co-employee was acting within the course of his employment in a
California case, an anomalous result may be reached whereby the
co-employee is found to be within the course of employment for the
purpose of compensation benefits but not for the purpose of tort im-
munity.
28
A general contractor may also, under certain conditions, be
considered a third party, and thus subject to suit by a sub-
contractor's employee. If a general contractor has not met the con-
ditions for establishing himself as a statutory employer, he will
remain liable as a third party. Forty-three states have adopted
''statutory employer" or "contractor under" statutes, which
provide that the general contractor shall be liable for compensation
to the subcontractor's employees. Under such statutes the general
contractor is required to provide workmen's compensation benefits
for a subcontractor's employees who perform work that is a part of
the business, trade, or occupation of the contractor. States have
generally required the general contractor to provide such com-
pensation only in cases in which the subcontractor is uninsured.
Other states have imposed liability without reference to the sub-
contractor's insurance. 29 In these latter jurisdictions, courts have
generally not allowed third-party tort actions to be brought by the
subcontractor's employees against the general contractor. These
courts have reasoned that, because the statute effectively makes the
general contractor the employer for compensation purposes, he
should be allowed to enjoy the immunity of an employer from
third-party suit. 30 Ordinarily, in cases in which the statute merely
subjects the general contractor to the secondary obligation of
providing compensation, the courts have found the general con-
tractor vulnerable to third-party liability. There is, however, a split
of authority, with a marked trend toward allowing the general con-
tractor immunity. 3 When the injured employee's actual employer
27. McIvor v. Savage, 220 Cal. App. 2d 128, 33 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1963).
28. Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal. 2d 124, 403 P.2d 400, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1965). In Saala, an
employee was struck in her employer's parking lot after work by a vehicle driven by a co-employee.
She was not barred from suing the co-employee, even though the co-employee would have been
entitled to compensation benefits if injured in the accident. Id. at 128, 403 P.2d at 403, 45 Cal. Rptr.
at 147.
29. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, S 72.31, at 14-47; see, e.g., Moore v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 189 F.
Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Whitaker v. Douglas, 179 Kan. 64, 292 P.2d 688 (1956).
30.2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 72.31, at 14-
4 7 .
31. Id. at 14-49 to -55. In Boetner v. Twin City Constr. Co., 214 N.,V.2d 635 (N.D. 1974), the
North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted section 65-01-02(5)(c) of the North Dakota Century Code
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is not a true subcontractor, but an independent contractor over
whom the general contractor has no control, the general contractor
remains subject to third-party suit.
32
A great majority of jurisdictions permit the injured employee
of a general contractor to sue the subcontractor as a third party.
The reason for this different result is that, although the general con-
tractor has a statutory liability (whether primary or secondary) to
the employees of the subcontractor, the subcontractor has no
corresponding statutory liability to the general contractor's em-
ployees.33 Recoveries by a general contractor's employees against
subcontractors effectively dissipate the workmen's compensation
limitation on the general contractor's liability. Because the
recoveries act to increase the liability insurance premiums of the in-
sured subcontractor, the subcontractor reflects this increase in his
service prices to the contractor. The result appears neither rational
nor desirable in light of the policies of the overall system.
Employers' managers and executives may also be subject to
third-party actions. These "upper level" employees are often in-
sured by the employer against work-related liability. An odd result
may occur in such situations. The "upper level" employee at fault
is not required to bear the cost of the injury, and the employer, in
paying additional insurance costs, incurs additional liability in ex-
cess of the statutorily limited liability mandated under the com-
pensation act. 
34
IV. THE PARTIES' INTERESTS, THE PROBLEMS, AND
SOLUTIONS
A. THE EMPLOYER, EMPLOYEE, AND THIRD PARTY INTERESTS
The interests of the respective parties involved in the work-
men's compensation scheme can be set out fairly simply. The em-
ployer has a primary interest in ensuring that his liability for
compensation paid for employee injuries does not exceed that
(Norn Dakota's "contractor under" statute), and held that the general contractor is the employer of
the subcontractor's or independent contractor's employees and is responsible for their workmen's
compensation coverage only until the subcontractor or independent contractor obtains coverage. Id.
at 638-40 (citing the district court's unpublished opinion). This relationship dissolves when the
necessary coverage is secured and paid for. The general contractor is immune from suit by the
subcontractor's employees only for the period covered by the premiums paid by the general
contractor. Once the subcontractor begins to pay the necessary premiums, the general contractor
becomes a third party subject to suit.
32. 2A LARSON supranote 1, S 72.31, at 14-58.
33. Id., S 72.32, at 14-67. Neither Massachusetts nor Florida, however, allows the employee of a
general contractor to sue a subcontractor. Younger v. Giller Contracting Co., 143 Fla. 335, 196 So.
690 (1940); Catalano v. George F. Watts Corp., 225 Mass. 605, 152 N.E. 46 (1926).
34. See generally 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 72.10, at 14-34 to -35.
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established by the workmen's compensation schedule. He also
maintains a secondary interest in retaining his right to receive
reimbursement when a third party's action has caused him to incur
obligations to his employee under the compensation act. The
employee's primary interest is assuring his receipt of the full
compensation benefit that he is statutorily entitled to. He is also
concerned with maintaining his right to seek a common-law
recovery against the third party to the extent that the actions of the
third party have contributed to the harm he has suffered. The third
party's interest is solely that of limiting his liability to the extent of
his established fault.35 The contrast of interests is apparent. While
acting to secure both the primary and secondary interests of both
employer and employee, workmen's compensation statutes in most
instances effectively bar the interest of the third party.
The recent acceptance of the comparative negligence fault con-
cept36 in many jurisdictions 37 only serves to strengthen the interest
of the third party in limiting his contribution to the employee's
recovery to no more than his proportionate share. 38 The acceptance
of comparative negligence by the majority of jurisdictions, when
viewed in light of the workmen's compensation acts and the
associated contribution statutes previously discussed, has resulted
in a growing confusion within the judicial system. 39
B. THE PROBLEMS
Courts, in confronting the problem of contribution in the area
of workmen's compensation, have fashioned a general rule that a
third-party tortfeasor who is liable to an employee in an action for
damages may not receive contribution from a negligent employer. 40
Pennsylvania had been the only state to allow third-party actions
for contribution against the employer. Contribution in Penn-
sylvania had been limited, however, to the amount of the em-
ployer's liability under the workmen's compensation act. 41 .
35. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 122, 257 N.W.2d 679, 685 (1977).
36. In its pure form, comparative negligence would allow jury assignment of percentages of
liability to employer, employee, and the third party, thereby facilitating mathematical precision in
establishing liability. 'SeeGC. HEFT & C. HzEFr, supra note 2, at S 1.50.
37. See supra note 2.
38. 312 Minn. at 124, 257 N.W.2d at 686.
39. The confusion is understandable when it is recognized that in ordinary proceedings the jury
is allowed to determine the existence of fault and then apportion it among the involved parties. In
workmen's compensation actions, however, the jury's conclusions are summarily disallowed, and
only third-party liability is imposed, without regard to the respective fault of the parties.
40. The courts of forty-six jurisdictions generally deny recovery of contribution from the
employer. See 2A LARSON, supra note 1, 5 76.21, at 14-295. See also 53 A. L.R.2d 978 (1957).
41. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, 5 76.22. at 14-307; see Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 123 A.2d 837
(1956). Subsequent to the Socha decision, the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1974 amended the
Pennsylvania workmen's compensation statute to read in part as follows:
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Courts seem to base the rule barring contribution on one of
two reasons. A number of jurisdictions have grounded the rule on a
finding that the employer and the third party are not under a com-
mon liability to the injured employee. 42 The courts have reasoned
that an employer is not jointly liable to the employee in tort because
the employer's liability is absolute, based on the compensation acts;
therefore, because negligence is not a factor for liability, the em-
ployer cannot be a joint tortfeasor. 43 The employee's claim against
his employer is for statutory benefits, while his claim against the
third party is for damages based on common-law negligence. 44
Common liability is held not to arise from claims that are different
in kind.
45
The second rationale used by courts to deny employer
contribution has been the use of an exclusive remedy approach.
Courts have construed particular statutes to not only limit the em-
In the event injury or death to an employee is caused by a third party, then such
employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin,
and anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages by reason thereof, may bring their
action at law against such third party, but the employer, his insurance carrier, their
servants and agents, employees, representatives acting on their behalf or at their
request shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contribution, or indemnity in
any action at law, or otherwise, unless liability for such damages, contributions or
indemnity shall be expressly provided for in a written contract entered into by the
party alleged to be liable prior to the date of occurrence which gave rise to the action.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, S 481(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980). In Hefferin v. Stempkowski, 247 Pa. Super.
Ct. 366, , 372 A.2d 869, 871 (1977), the court noted that the 1974 amendment to this section
was not mere recitation of current law, but rather made the Workmen's Compensation Act a
complete subsitute for, not supplemental to, common-law tort actions. The court held that the Act
granted the employer immunity from suit and barred his joinder as an additional defendant in an
action by the employee against a third party; the employer's right to subrogation was held
unchanged. Id. at __, 372 A.2d at 871; cf. Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615
(1974). In Carlson, the Supreme Court of Minnesota struck down as violative of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment a remarkably similar statute. See also Albrecht v. Pneuco Mach.
Co., 448 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Atkins v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., - Pa. -, 414
A.2d 100 (1980); Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., - Pa. __, 412 A.2d 1094 (1980).
In Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977), the Supreme
Court of Minnesota allowed employer contribution in a third-party action, using the approach
established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The court held that contribution among joint
tortfeasors does not depend onjoint liability. Id. at 130, 257 N.W.2d at 685.
Two states, California and North Carolina, have reached the same result as Pennsylvania,
although by a somewhat different approach. Both California and North Carolina courts have held
that an injured employee's recovery is reduced by the amount ofworkmen's compensation received.
See, e.g., Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961); Tate v. Superior
Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1963); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending and
Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953). See also Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,
282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). In Dole, the Court of Appeals of New York effectively
abolished the distinction between indemnity and contribution for the purpose of allocation of
damages among joint tortfeasors. The court found that, in some cases, damages resulting from
employee injuries may be apportioned between the third party and the employer, in spite of
workmen's compensation statutes. Id. at 154, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
42. See White v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., Inc., 225 F. Supp. 940 (D.N.D. 1964); Hake v. Soo
Line R.R. Co., 258 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1977) (applying Wisconsin law); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 275 N.W.2d 618 (N.D. 1979).
43. See Sanderson v. Binnings Constr. Co., 172 So. 2d 721 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Farren v. New
Jersey Turnpike Auth., 31 N.J. Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (1954).
44. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain, 298 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1962).
45. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.21, at 14-297 to -298.
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ployer's liability, but also to preclude any liability to third parties
for contribution. 46 This rationale totally disregards the loss
allocation principles found in comparative negligence, because the
denial of contribution effectively transfers the employer's entire
burden to the third party, regardless of the employer's degree of
fault. 47
In comparative negligence jurisdictions, the claim against the
third party is reduced in proportion to the injured employee's
degree of negligence. A problem arises, however, in cases in which
the employer seeks contribution from the third party. In such cases,
because the employer's cause of action is derived solely from his
employee's suit, the employer's negligence is generally irrelevant
and does not reduce or bar the recovery against the third party. 48
Under the present system of third-party contribution the
following inequities are present: (1) the employer is entitled to
contribution from the third party, whereas the third party is not
entitled to contribution from the employer, and (2) in cases in
which the employer seeks contribution from the third party, the
recovery is not reduced by the employer's proportionate degree of
fault.
C. SOLUTIONS
In light of the increasing adoption of comparative negligence
and the problems presented by third-party involvement under
workmen's compensation laws, courts and commentators have of-
fered a number of solutions to contribution problems.
49
The first proposal would result in a major departure from the
majority rule. It would allow a third party to bring an action
against the employer and shift all or part of the liability to the
employer by apportioning damages according to relative fault. This
solution would be in accord with the objective of comparative
negligence, i.e., an equitable allocation of costs in proportion to
fault. The deterring effect the proposal would have is apparent. By
allowing the employer to be held liable through contribution for the
portion of damage directly attributable to him, the employer will be
46. See, e.g., Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 362 F. Supp. 646 (D. Nev. 1973), aff'd, 506 F. 2d
1216 (9th Cir. 1974); Jordan v. Solventol Chem. Prods., Inc., 74 Mich. App, 113, 253 N.W.2d 676
(1977).
47. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 433 (4th ed. 1971).
48. See, e.g., Randall v. United States, 282 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Froysland v. Leef Bros.,
Inc.. 293 Minn. 201. 197 N.W.2d 656 (1972). Seealso ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 5 172.40 (Supp. 1979).
49. See 2A LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 76.20-.44; Philips, Contribution and Indemnity in Products
Liability, 42 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1974); Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Worker's
Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035.
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less likely to contribute (either directly by action or indirectly by
inaction) to the cause of the injury. The employer will make efforts
to require that, at the very least, non-stranger third parties
minimize or eliminate any dangerous conditions.
In the event a contribution scheme is adopted, three
possible methods of limiting the amount of contribution a third par-
ty would be allowed to recover have been suggested. 50 First, the
amount of contribution allowed may be limited to the amount that
the employer would be required to pay under workmen's com-
pensation. As noted earlier, Pennsylvania judicially adopted this
approach, although it was later legislatively rejected. 51 Minnesota,
California, and North Carolina have, in essence, judicially adopted
the Pennsylvania approach .5
2
A second method of limiting contribution from employers is
that enunciated by the Court of Appeals of New York in Dole v.
Dow Chemical Co. 5 3 In Dole, the court found that in some cases
damages compensable under workmen's compensation can be ap-
portioned between the third party and the employer, regardless of
workmen's compensation statutes.5 4 Again, the deterring effect of
such a scheme is apparent. By establishing a greater loss potential
to the employer, a greater incentive to minimize or eliminate ac-
cident-causing conditions will exist. Militating against the adoption
of a Dole scheme of pure contribution, however, is the strong public
50. See Weisgall, supra note 49, at 1058-80.
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. Id. See also Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
53. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
54. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 154, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391
(1972). In Dole, an employee died from inhaled fumes while cleaning his employer's grain storage
bin. The bin had been sprayed with a chemical manufactured by Dow. Dow, being sued by the
employee's family for negligently labeling its product, brought suit against the employer for full
recovery of any damages for which Dow might be found liable. Dow based its action on a theory that
its alleged negligence was "passive," while the employer's negligence in failing to warn its employee
and failing to use the product properly was "active."
The Court of Appeals of -New York abolished the distinction between contribution and
indemnity when allocating responsibility among joint tortfeasors, and concluded that damages
should be apportioned between the third party and the employer according to their degrees of fault.
Id. at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. An example of a Dole-type recovery is
illustrated as follows: Suppose that an injured employee's total damages are $20,000 and that he has
received $9,000 in workmen's compensation benefits. Assume that the third party was 40%
responsible for the loss, with the employer 60% liable. The employee would recover his full $20,000
from the third party in the tort suit. The third party would eventually pay only $8,000 of this
amount, which is proportionate to his degree of fault. The employer would pay $12,000, the amount
proportionate to his degree of fault. The employer, having a right to reimbursement of his
compensation outlay from the proceeds of the third-party suit, would get back $9,000 from the
employee. The employee would not receive a double recovery, but would be left with the original
$20,000 full recovery. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, 5 76.22, at 14-320. To date, Dole has been followed
by the New York courts. See, e.g., Nelson v. Dykes Lumber Co., Inc., 52 A.D.2d 808, 382 N.Y.S.2d
335 (1976). But see Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 725 (2d Cir.-1980) (commenting on
the Dole apportionment method).
In 1974, section 1401 of the New York Civil Practice Law was amended to provide for an
equitable division of reponsibility among all wrongdoers, thereby effectively codifying the Dole
apportionment scheme. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1976).
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policy toward maintaining an efficient, fixed scheme of recovery for
the injured employee.
55
A third contribution scheme, which is actually a compromise
between the two previously mentioned plans, is to allow con-
tribution not exceeding an arbitrary limit which is greater than the
statutorily mandated workmen's compensation payment. An im-
portant aspect of the compensation bargain, the elimination of
unlimited liability to the employer, is maintained, and a fixed
ceiling is provided on the employer's liability, thereby allowing a
reasonably precise framework within which to predict future com-
pensation costs.
A noncontribution solution to the third-party problem would
entail the abolition of third-party actions in cases involving work-
men's compensation, thereby making the accident victim totally
dependent on workmen's compensation for benefits. This would be
a truly "exclusive remedy." 56 This scheme, standing alone, would
limit the recovery available to an injured employee to the amount
fixed by the workmen's compensation schedule, which is often
found to be inadequate and frequently nowhere near the true costs
of the injury.
57
By eliminating third-party suits and establishing the work-
men's compensation system as the employee's sole remedy, the
non-fault concept underlying the system would be extended beyond
the employer-employee relationship to include all parties to the
workplace relation. 8 Injured employees would gain no advantage
from such a system, while third parties would benefit im-
measurably from the resultant immunity from both employee suits
and employer subrogation actions. Although a noted commentator
has suggested that such a change in the existing scheme would
reasonably require that the injured employee receive a quid pro quo
increase in benefits, 59 the bargain remains heavily weighted on the
third party's side of the scale. Admittedly, the suggested increases
probably will not be as large as the potential damage recovery now
available to the employee. A three-party inclusive system would
allow the employee to avoid the uncertainties of litigation. The in-
jured employee, however, in part maintains that security within the
present system.
60
55. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, S 2.20.
56. See Weisgall, supra note 49, at 1071-80.
57. Id. at 1072 n.157.
58. Id. at 1071-72.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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The benefits arising out of the establishment of the com-
pensation system as the exclusive remedy for injured employees
weigh too heavily on the third-party's side. The injured employee is
asked to give up his right to maintain a negligence action against a
third-party tortfeasor, and the potential of making himself whole,
in exchange for an admittedly inadequate, exclusive remedy
scheme that furnishes him nothing more than the existing system
provides.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems involved in deciding whether comparative
negligence and contribution concepts are preferable to the non-
fault concept of workmen's compensation are complex and dif-
ficult. 61 At best, courts should be expected to provide a short-term
compromise of the competing policies. Courts appear to have
adopted such compromises with a limited degree of success. The
long-term solution requires legislative action to equitably adjust the
rights between the third party and the negligent employer. In the
meantime, a question which remains to be answered is whether the
compensation acts, in conferring immunity on the employer from
common-law suit, were meant to do so only at the expense of the in-
jured employee, or also at the expense of outsiders.62
Four alternative short-term solutions have been offered by the
courts. One appears to meet the equitable principles required by
the system. The Dole apportionment rule attempts to solve the
problem and provide recovery on a purely equitable basis. 63 In
adopting a Dole-type apportionment scheme, the interests of the
employee will be maintained. There will not be any intrusion upon
the employee's primary interest of assuring his receipt of full work-
men's compensation benefits, or upon his secondary interest of
maintaining his right to seek a common-law recovery against a
negligent third party. The third-party's sole interest, that of
limiting his liability to the extent of his established fault, is fully
satisfied. The employer's primary interest, assuring that his
liability does not exceed the established statutory limits, suffers a
potential intrusion under the Dole scheme. 64 The potential intrusion
61. See Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action Over Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L.
REV. 351, 420 (1970).
62. Id.
63. 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 76.22, at 14-320. In referring to the Dole apportionment scheme,
Professor Larson stated: "[Reserving the question of the compensation law exclusive-remedy issue,
one may go on to observe that the end result may well be the most equitable yet achieved by any
,jurisdiction." Id.
64. See supra note 54. Had the employer's statutory maximum liability been the $9,000 in the
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could possibly be eliminated by treating the statutory relationship
between the employer and his employee as a form of settlement
between the parties. By allowing settlement principles to control,
the employer would purchase his peace at the expense of his
statutory liability under the act, and would not be liable to anyone
for contribution. The employer's interest in limiting his liability to
the statutory maximum is therefore maintained at the cost of
depriving the third party of the right to contribution.
The employer's secondary interest, that of maintaining his
right to reimbursement from a negligent third party, is left intact
under the Dole scheme. It might be suggested that when an em-
ployer is required by statute to pay his employee more than the sum
found to be attributable to his percentage of fault, he should be
allowed to seek reimbursement of that excess amount from the em-
ployee's common-law recovery from the third party.
65
The Dole apportionment scheme reaches an equitable balance
of interests between the two parties most directly involved in the
controversy, while maintaining fully the interests of the secondary
party, the employee. Short of legislative action, the apportionment
approach taken under the Dole scheme appears to afford the most
equitable short-term solution to the controversy. 
66
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hypothetical, his interest in having to pay out no more than that amount would not have been main-
tained.
65. An example may be helpful at this point. Suppose that an injured employee's total damages
are $20,000 and the employer's statutory obligation to the employee is $1,200. Assume that the third
party and the employer are each 50% responsible for the loss. The employee would receive his
$10,000 from the third party in the tort suit. Because the workmen's compensation relationship be-
tween employer and employee would be viewed as a settlement, the employee would recover nothing
from the employer beyond the $1,200 he is entitled to under the act. The employer's responsibility
would be limited to the statutory requirement. The employer is precluded from receiving reim-
bursement for the compensation paid out in this case because his obligation under the act ($1,200) is
less than the proportionate amount required by his degree of negligence ($10,000).
Changing the facts slightly, assume that total damages remain the same, the responsibility of the
third party and the employer remain the same, and the employer's statutory obligation to the em-
ployee is $12,000. The employee will recover $10,000 from the third party in a tort suit. The em-
ployee's total recovery will therefore equal $22,000, which is $2,000 in excess of the total damage
award. The employer's obligation is $2,000 in excess of his degree of responsibility, and he therefore
should be allowed to seek reimbursement of that excess amount from the employee's recovery from
the third party. The employee's full damage recovery is maintained, and the employer is not forced
to pay an amount in excess of his statutory obligation upon his degree of responsibility.
66. North Dakota readers of this Note should be aware that as this issue was going to press the
Supreme Court of North Dakota handed down a decision which may have an effect on the third-
party contribution issue in North Dakota. In Gernand v. Ost Servs., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500 (N.D.
1980), a third-party contribution action involving workmen's compensation, the North Dakota
Supreme Court, without discussing the validity of a district court damages apportionment plan,
upheld a summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id. at 505.

